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SEPARATION OF POWERS
explained that since the legislature has expressly granted the
Commissioner with the authority to evaluate and apply all rules
relating to the temporary release program, Executive Order No.
5 does not usurp legislative domain nor is it inconsistent with
legislative intent.53 In conclusion, Governor Pataki's Executive
Order No. 5 does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers
since it is consistent with legislative policy. 54
Dorst v. Pataki 55
(decided October 9, 1995)
Five inmates5 6 at the Albion Correctional Facility in Albion,
New York, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, brought an Article 78 proceeding 57 against Governor
doctrine of separation of powers. Cark, 66 N.Y.2d at 186-87, 486 N.E.2d at
795, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 937-38. The court, rejecting this claim, held that since
the legislature granted the State Board of Elections the power to encourage
voter participation and that voter registration forms should be readily available,
the executive order did not "represent[1 a 'nullification' of legislative action."
Id. at 190, 486 N.E.2d at 798, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (citation omitted).
53. Day, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
54. Id.
55. 633 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1995).
56. Two of the five inmates, Antoinette Ferrer and Miriam Rodriquez,
were approved for the temporary work release program prior to the signing of
Executive Order No. 5. Id. at 737.
57. Generally, an article 78 proceeding is appropriate to determine
whether a statute is being applied in an unconstitutional way. Id. at 732. Bil
see Allen v. Blum, 58 N.Y.2d 954, 956, 227 N.E.2d 68, 68, 460 N.Y.S.2d
520, 521 (1983); Zuckerman v. Board of Educ., 44 N.Y.2d 336, 343-44, 376
N.E.2d 1297, 1301, 405 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656 (1978); Kovarsky v. Housing and
Development Administration, City of N.Y., 31 N.Y.2d 184, 191-92, 286
N.E.2d 882, 885, 335 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387-88 (1972). These cases stand for the
proposition that the court of appeals has uniformly held that it is proper to
convert such a proceeding to a declaratory judgment action where the
"constitutionality of a statute is at issue, or where petitioners seek review of a
continuing policy." Accordingly, the court in this case exercised its discretion
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George E. Pataki, alleging that Executive Order No. 558 was
unconstitutional in that it violated the doctrine of separation of
powers. 5 9 Executive Order No. 5 instructed the Commissioner of
the Department of Correctional Services to develop rules to
prevent the future transfer of any inmate sentenced as a violent
felony offender convicted of a crime involving the infliction of
serious physical injury, the use or threatened use of a dangerous
instrument or the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon to any
temporary release program or residential treatment facility.60
Shortly after the governor signed the order, the commissioner
amended title 7, section 1900.4(c) of the Official Compilation of
Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York "to bar
any inmate from participating in temporary release whose current
commitment is for a crime involving either the use or threatened
use of a deadly weapon or a dangerous weapon or a dangerous
instrument or the infliction of serious physical injury."61 As a
result, the petitioners became ineligible for participation in the
temporary release program. 62 In addition, in June of 1995, the
legislature amended section 851(2) of the New York Correction
Law to provide that "[tihe governor, by executive order, may
exclude or limit the participation of any class of otherwise
eligible inmates from participation in a temporary release
58. Id. at 731. The order was signed by the governor on January 24, 1995.
Id.
59. Id. at 733. Petitioners argued that the order violated the principle of
separation of powers as stated in the New York State Constitution. N.Y.
CONST. art. III, § 1. This provision provides: "The legislative powers of this
state shall be vested in the senate and assembly." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, §
1. This provision provides in pertinent part: "The executive power shall be
vested in the governor. ... " Id.
60. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
61. Id. at 731-32. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 1900.4(c)
(1994). The amendment listed several offenses, the commission of which
would cause the inmate to be ineligible for participation in the temporary work
release programs. The offenses included burglary in the first and second
degree, robbery in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first and
second degrees, aggravated assault upon a peace or police officer, and criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree. Id.
62. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
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SEPARATION OF POWERS
program." 63 While holding that the executive order and the
regulations were invalid as a violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the court upheld the statutory amendment
to section 851(2) of the Correction Law. 64
The court was faced with several issues, primarily, whether it
was appropriate for the governor, by executive order, "to direct
the commissioner to change the eligibility requirements for the
temporary release program and eliminate inmates convicted of
violent felonies from future participation in the program."65 If
so, the court would have to decide whether Executive Order No.
5 violated the petitioner's due process rights in that they were no
longer permitted to participate in the program after having been
previously approved. 66 Furthermore, the court had to determine
whether the legislative branch appropriately delegated its
authority to the executive branch by providing the governor with
the power to change the eligibility requirements for the
temporary work release program via executive order. 67
Addressing the first issue, petitioners argued that the
governor's executive order was inappropriate in that he
impermissibly usurped legislative power in changing the
definition of "eligible inmate." 68 In the court of appeals' most
63. Id. at 732. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 851(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
This subsection is to go into effect on September 1, 1997. The court explained
that to the best of its knowledge, the governor had not yet issued a new
executive order in compliance with the amended statute. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d
at 732. However, it anticipated that the governor would take such action in the
near future. Id. at 737.
64. Id. at 735-37.
65. Id. at 732.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 733. N.Y. CoRREcT. LAw § 851(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
This section defines an "eligible inmate" as
a person confined in an institution who is eligible for release on parole
or who will become eligible for release on parole or conditional release
within two years .... Notwithstanding the foregoing, no person who is
an otherwise eligible inmate who is under sentence for crime involving:
(a) infliction of serious physical injury upon another as defined in the
penal law, (b) a sex offense involving forcible compulsion, or (c) any
other offense involving the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon
19961 1203
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recent separation of powers case, Bourquin v. Cuomo,69 quoting
Clark v. Cuomo,70 it explained that the separation of powers
doctrine "is implied by the separate grants of power to each of
the coordinate branches of government,"' 7 1 and acknowledged
that "some overlap between the three separate branches does not
violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers.-"72 In
Bourquin, Chief Judge Kaye explained the impossibility of
"neatly divid[ing]" the "duties and powers of the legislature and
executive branches . .. into isolated pockets." 73 Furthermore,
the court of appeals, in Under 21 v. City of New York, 74 restated
the well settled principle that "no one branch [of government
may participate in a temporary release program without the written
approval of the commissioner.
Id.
69. 85 N.Y.2d 781, 652 N.E.2d 171, 627 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1995). In
Bourquin, the court held that the governor had not exceed his power by issuing
Executive Order No. 141, which authorized the "creation of a private, not-for-
profit corporation known as the Citizen's Utility Board (CUB) intended,
among other things, to represent the interests of residential utility customers in
ratemaking and other proceedings before the Public Service Commission," and
as such, did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 784, 652
N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
70. 66 N.Y.2d 185, 486 N.E.2d 794, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1985). In Clark,
the court of appeals held that the executive order, establishing a program to
increase voter registration by requiring certain state agencies to make voter
registration forms available, did not violate the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Id. at 192, 486 N.E.2d at 799-80, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 941-
42. The court reasoned that the executive order was not inconsistent with the
policy of the legislature, which was to promote the greatest possible
participation in elections, despite the legislature's failure to enact legislation
that would accomplish substantially the same result as the executive order. Id.
71. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
72. Id.
73. Bourquin, 66 N.Y.2d at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
620.
74. 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985). In Under
21, Chief Judge Wachtler held that an executive order issued by the mayor was
invalid as an unauthorized use of executive power. Id. at 364, 482 N.E.2d at
10, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 531. The executive order prohibited employment
discrimination by city contractors on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 353,
482 N.E.2d at 2-3, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
1204 [Vol 12
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [2020], No. 3, Art. 67
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/67
SEPARATION OF POWERS
should] be allowed to arrogate unto itself power residing entirely
in another branch." 75
When considering whether an action taken by the executive
branch exceeds its authority as limited by the separation of
powers doctrine, the court of appeals has examined the policy
supporting the action, and contemplated whether the action was
consistent with action taken by the legislature. 7 6
Applying these standards to the present case, the court
determined that the legislature explicitly chose to attach certain
requirements to determine the eligibility of inmates for the
tempbrary work release program. 77 The legislature, however, did
not completely exclude an entire group of inmates from
participation in the program, in contrast with what Executive
Order No. 5 provided. 78 Correction Law section 851(2) allowed
the commissioner broad discretion for promulgating the
regulations regarding the temporary work release program, but
75. Id. at 353, 482 N.E.2d at 2, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
76. See Matter of Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595,
385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976). In Broidrick, the court of appeals struck down an
affirmative action program for contracts in New York City because it
determined that the City of New York had acted in excess of its authority, as
granted by the legislature, in promulgating the regulation. Id. at 644, 350
N.E.2d at 596, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 266. The regulations included specific quotas
to be complied with, instead of a percentage employment formula, which
would most likely have survived constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 644, 350
N.E.2d at 596, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 266. The court looked to whether the
executive action "create[d] a different policy, not embraced in the legislation."
Id. at 646, 350 N.E.2d at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
77. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 733. The court stated that section 851(2) of
the Correction Law provides:
[I]nmates . . . convicted of certain specified violent felonies involving
"the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument"
are eligible to apply for the program once they reach 18 months of their
parole or conditional release eligibility date... otherwise eligible
inmates who are under sentence for crimes involving either the infliction
of serious physical injury upon another as defined in the Penal Law or
any other offense involving the use or threatened use of a deadly
weapon require the written approval of the Commissioner before they
may participate in the temporary release program.
Id. (citing N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 851(2)).
78. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
1996] 1205
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required that the commissioner be "guided by consideration for
the safety of the community and the welfare of the inmate." '79
Pointing out that, although the commissioner has discretion to
evaluate the eligibility of an inmate for the temporary work
release program on a case-by-case basis, the court explained that
the commissioner was bound by the forgoing guideline. 80 In
contrast, Executive Order No. 5, on its face, precluded "the
commissioner from exercising any discretion concerning the
participation of violent felons in the temporary release program,
despite the fact that the Legislature explicitly confers this
discretion upon the commissioner."' 81 As such, the order was
clearly inconsistent with the statutory requirements provided in
Correction Law section 851(2). Therefore, the court concluded
that Executive Order No. 5 violated the doctrine of separation of
powers and rendered it unconstitutional. 82
The court next considered whether the amendment to
Correction Law section 851(2)83 was intended to have a
retroactive effect. Relying on Thomas v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.84
for the proposition that the language and intent of the statute
itself determines if it should be applied retroactively, and on
Murphy v. Board of Education of North Bellmore Union Free
School District,85 the court reasoned that since there were no
explicit terms within the statute indicating that it was intended to
be applied retroactively, it ruled that the statute would be
interpreted and applied prospectively. 86
79. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 1900.4(1)(4) (1994).
80. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 735.
83. The legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 5281, which amended
Correction Law section 851(2). Id.
84. 63 N.Y.2d 150, 470 N.E.2d 831, 481 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1984).
85. 104 A.D.2d 796, 480 N.Y.S.2d 138 (2d Dep't 1984), aff'd, 64
N.Y.2d 856, 476 N.E.2d 651, 487 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1985). The court referred
to the general rule that "statutes are to be construed as prospective only in the
absence of an unequivocal expression of a legislative intent to the
contrary. . . ." Id. at 797, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
86. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
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The question that had to be resolved after the court concluded
that the executive order was invalid and that the amended
Correction Law did not retroactively validate the order, was
whether it was appropriate for the legislature to delegate to the
executive branch the authority to curtail or exclude otherwise
eligible inmates from participating in the temporary work release
program. 87 The court of appeals explained that:
Because of the constitutional provision that 'the legislative power
of this state shall be vested in the Senate and the Assembly', the
Legislature cannot pass on its law-making functions to other
bodies, but there is no constitutional prohibition against the
delegation of power, with reasonable safeguards and standards,
to an agency or commission to administer the law as enacted by
the Legislature. 88
Furthermore, the court has reasoned that "the principle that the
legislative branch may not delegate all of its lawmaking powers
to the executive branch has been applied with the utmost
reluctance." 89 Accordingly. the court in this case rejected the
petitioner's argument that the amendment was "overly vague" 90
and failed to provide "any guidelines or standards" 9 1 to aid the
governor in exercising the delegated power, and explained that
the legislature did not give the governor unfettered discretion or
limitless authority to revamp the temporary work release
program, but rather provided that the governor should take into
consideration "the safety of the community and the welfare of the
inmate" 92 when asserting his authority in this area. 93 Therefore,
the court concluded that the "Senate Bill 5281, signed into law on
87. Id.
88. Levine v. Whalen, 39 N.Y.2d 510, 515, 349 N.E.2d 820, 822, 384
N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (1976).
89. Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1353, 523
N.Y.S.2d 464, 468 (1987).
90. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
91. Id.
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June 10, 1995, does not represent an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority." 94
Finally, the court examined the argument asserted by
petitioners Antoinette Ferrer and Miriam Rodriquez, who were
already approved for the program prior to the promulgation of
the new regulations pursuant to the executive order. 95 They
contended that they were exempt from the altered eligibility
requirements because they had already been selected to
participate and because the regulations explicitly provided for
"future transfer."' 96 Although this issue was rendered moot due
to the court's invalidation of Executive Order No. 5, the court
anticipated that the governor would issue another executive
order, and, therefore, addressed its concerns about excluding
inmates who had been previously approved for the program,
mainly because such an exclusion raises important due process
considerations. 97 The Second Circuit, in Tracy v. Salamack,9 8
held that "[a] due process hearing is required before inmates
already participating in or approved for the program may be
removed," 99 despite the well-settled rule that the ex post facto
doctrine does not apply to the temporary release program. 100 The
Dorst court agreed with the Tracy court, and unanimously
explained that:
Due process mandates a similar hearing and review process for
those petitioners approved for the program who were nonetheless
denied participation because of a change in their eligibility status.
Fundamental fairness would dictate that the Government should
not take away what has already been given without at a minimum
94. Id.
95. Id. After the order was signed, both inmates were informed that they




98. 572 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1978).
99. Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 79 A.D.2d 687, 434 N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d
Dep't), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 919 (1980).
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affording a hearing to ensure that due process requirements have
been satisfied. 10 1
101. Dorst, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
9
et al.: Separation of Powers
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [2020], No. 3, Art. 67
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/67
